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INTRODUCTION 
2 
 
Very soon it will be a quarter of a century since the first EU directive in the field of copyright 
was adopted.
1
 The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU” or 
“the Court”) on copyright is now pervasive; there is no aspect of copyright it has not ruled 
on.
2
 Since its landmark judgment in Infopaq in 2009
3
, many of its decisions in the field of 
copyright have generated controversy mainly because of the Court’s activism or 
‘harmonisation bug’. The Court has often filled gaps in the acquis communautaire where the 
silence of the texts could have meant that the competence still belonged to Member States.  
This article examines how the CJEU case law has impacted UK copyright law in two main 
areas: the concept of work and the originality requirement, which also includes the 
infringement test as it is at least in part a reflection of the originality requirement (sections 4 
and 5). To map the changes, the article first recalls the concepts in UK law pre-Infopaq, in the 
acquis communautaire and as interpreted by the CJEU (sections 1, 2 and 3). It also sketches 
the current and potential impact in other areas of UK copyright law and also notes that the 
CJEU’s impact is not limited only to the UK; notions of copyright law are being changed in 
many Member States. The article concludes by trying to determine what the future holds for 
UK copyright law but also for copyright law more generally (section 6). As the Irish 
copyright act on the points analysed in this article is almost an exact copy of the British 
copyright act, much of the analysis below is similarly applicable to Irish law. 
 
1. THE concepts OF WORK AND OF ORIGINALITY IN UK LAW PRE-INFOPAQ  
Since its inception, the UK has had a closed list of works. Outside its eight categories – 
namely literary, dramatic, musical, artistic works, sound recordings, films, broadcasts and 
typographical arrangements of published editions
4
 - a creation cannot be protected even if it 
is original (for the first four) or even if it is not a copy (for the last four). This principle lead 
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1
 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection 
of computer programs (Codified version), OJ L111 of 5.5.2009, codifying Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 
May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122/42, hereinafter ‘software directive’. Unless 
otherwise stated, all citations to the literature omit footnotes. 
2
 By aspect, we mean the general aspects namely subject-matter, protection requirements, duration, rights, 
exceptions and remedies, not every provision of the acquis, and obviously only those aspects which have been 
harmonised (so this excludes for instance moral rights). In the past, the Court ruled on copyright only marginally 
as there was not yet any secondary law. Therefore, the case law was mainly dealing with freedom of movement 
goods (exhaustion) and competition issues. For a concise exposition of this case law, see E. Derclaye, “The 
European Union and Copyright” in P. Geller, ed., International Copyright Law and Practice, Lexis Nexis 
(Matthew Bender), updated every year, last update 2013. 
3
 Case C-5/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] E.C.R. I-6569. As a reminder 
this case dealt with news articles, small parts of which were reproduced and sent to subscribers by the media 
monitoring agency Infopaq. The question was whether there was a reproduction under article 2 of the Directive 
2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] 
OJ L167 (herein after referred to as ‘infosoc directive’). In determining this, the Court decided to interpret the 
term ‘work’ and held that the originality requirement was the author's own intellectual creation for literary 
works and arguably for all works. 
4
 Sections 3-8 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 as amended (CDPA). The first four categories 
correspond to the author’s rights in civil law countries while the last four categories correspond to the 
neighbouring rights in civil law countries (except that the last one does not exist in the vast majority of them). 
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to the (in)famous Creation Records
5
 and Nova v Mazooma
6
 decisions, in which a highly 
original scene and a video game respectively were considered unprotected by copyright. Two 
additional problems have arisen in relation to work categorisation. First, even if the 
categories are supposed to be waterproof, because of bad drafting, some are not. Thus a 
single effort can be at the same time a literary and an artistic work.
7
 Second, judges have also 
made one category of ‘entrepreneurial works’ (film) overlap with one category of ‘creative 
works’ (dramatic work).8 It may appear pedantic or purely cosmetic to the non-expert but it is 
not, because in UK law, the category in which a work falls determines its regime, so not only 
its duration (like in civil law countries) but also the rights and exceptions attached to it.
9
  
 
The traditional UK standard of originality requires checking two things: first, whether the 
work is not copied
10
 and second, whether the author has exerted sufficient skill, judgement or 
labour (“SSJL”).11 Courts have used a variety of words apart from the traditional ‘triumvirat’ 
of ‘skill, judgement and labour’ to find a work original, namely work, capital, effort, industry, 
time, knowledge, taste, ingenuity, experience, expense, investment.
12
 The traditional 
originality requirement thus encompasses equally creative works and works which required 
mere labour or capital, or even skill which does not necessarily involve creativity, so long as 
it is more than de minimis (hence the term sufficient). However, “[m]uch of the case law 
seems inconsistent”13 and “the dividing line between original ... works and ... unoriginal 
works, remains an uncertain and shifting one”.14 For one, courts sometimes use the triumvirat 
disjunctively (labour, skill or judgement), sometimes cumulatively (labour, skill and 
judgement); the latter formula seems to have had the most success in recent years. Second, 
originality depends on the facts of the case and is a question of degree in each case.
15
 Third, 
both the pre-expressive and expressive stages should be taken into account when determining 
if a work is original.
16
 Fourth, Interlego seems to have set other criteria for derivative 
                                                                
5
 Creation Records v News Group Newspapers [1997] E.M.L.R. 444 Ch D (even if there was no copyright in the 
scene and thus no copyright infringement, there was a breach of confidentiality). 
6
 Nova Productions v Mazooma Games & Ors [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), aff’d by [2007] EWCA Civ 219 
(however, the Court of Appeal did not reconsider whether the video game was a dramatic work as the appellant 
dropped that issue on appeal). Arguably, the Berne convention forces the UK to protect videogames because the 
expression “expressed by a process analogous to cinematography” imposed it from the outset, even if 
videogames were not known at the time. However, it all depends on how “analogous” and “cinematography” are 
to be interpreted. 
7
  S. 3(1) states in relevant part “In this Part - “literary work” means any work, other than a dramatic or musical 
work, which is written, spoken or sung” and thus does not exclude artistic works, and section 4 which deals with 
artistic works does not exclude literary works. In the so-called electronic diagrams cases, judges were split as to 
whether a single effort could be classed in two categories (literary and artistic). See Anacon Corporation v 
Environmental Research Technology [1994] FSR 659; Electronic Techniques (Anglia) v Critchley Components 
[1997] FSR 401; Mackie Designs v Behringer [1999] RPC 717; Aubrey Max Sandman v Panasonic U.K. Ltd 
[1998] FSR 651. 
8
 Norowzian v Arks (No.2) [2000] E.C.D.R. 205 (CA). For a detailed explanation, see Derclaye “Debunking 
some of UK copyright law’s longstanding myths and misunderstandings” [2013] 1 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 1-17 and references therein.  
9
 See ss. 17-21 of the CDPA for the rights and ss. 28-76 for the exceptions. 
10
 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601. 
11
 Ladbroke v. William Hill [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273, 278, 282. 
12
 L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2009, 95. 
13
 Ibid, 94. 
14
 S. Ricketson, “The concept of originality in Anglo-Australian copyright law” (1991) 9(2) Copyright Reporter 
1. 
15
 Macmillan v Cooper (1923) 93 LJPC 113 (Lord Atkinson), restated in Ladbroke v William Hill, above n 11, 
278 (HL).  
16
 Ladbroke v William Hill, above n 11; Bently & Sherman, above n 12, 96. 
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works.
17
 In short, skill and labour in copying does not count and there must be a material 
change of the right kind. Arguably, these statements are simply an application of the 
principles as University of London Press already stated that there cannot be copyright if there 
is copying. Material change simply means a new amount of sufficient skill, judgement or 
labour. One thing Interlego added though is that at least in the case of artistic works, the 
change must have visual significance.  
Pre-Infopaq, the UK did not have a single requirement of originality as it had to comply with 
the EU acquis which harmonised originality for photographs, computer programs and 
databases.
18
 However, the UK only implemented the requirement of the author's own 
intellectual creation for databases. And while the literature was in agreement that the new 
criterion applied to databases, it was not entirely clear if it was a higher requirement than 
SSJL.
19
 In our view, it was clear as the sui generis right was adopted to replace sweat of the 
brow.
20
 The CJEU confirmed this view in Football Dataco.
21
 In relation to computer 
programs, UK courts carried on applying the traditional SSJL standard even if they should 
have applied the author's own intellectual creation.
22
 Since the UK did not change the 
requirement of originality for photographs when it implemented the term directive, it is 
unclear whether the requirement for them was SSJL or the author’s own intellectual creation 
as mandated by article 6 of the directive.
23
 In conclusion, the legislature and courts generally 
ignored the new requirement and assumed it meant the same as the old one. 
 
2. THE concepts OF WORK AND originality IN THE ACQUIS  
Even if the term ‘work’ appears in most directives, the concept of work has only been 
harmonised in two directives namely the software and database directives. Only the database 
directive defines its subject-matter (art. 3(1)). The software directive does not define 
‘computer program’; it only states that preparatory design material is included in the 
protected subject-matter (art. 1.). Other than software and databases, the concept of work was 
not something that Member States saw necessary to harmonise.
24
 
 
                                                                
17
 Interlego v Tyco [1988] RPC 343. For Bently & Sherman, above n 12, 97, n 38, it may well be that there is no 
single originality criterion in the UK as in Interlego, Lord Oliver said that it would be erroneous to apply the test 
set out in Labrodke  (which dealt with literary compilations) to artistic works. 
18
 Articles 6 of Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified version), Official Journal L 372/12 
(hereinafter term directive), 1(3) of the software directive and 3(1) of the Directive 96/9 on the legal protection 
of databases [1996] OJ L77/20. 
19
 See e.g. Bently & Sherman, above n 12, 108.  
20
 E. Derclaye, The Legal Protection of Databases, A Comparative Analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2008 
chapter 3, section 3.1 and chapter 4 and references therein. See also A. Beunen, Protection for databases: the 
European Database Directive and its effects in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2007, 76-77.  
21
 Case C-604/10, Football Dataco v Yahoo UK! [2012] nyr. All decisions not yet reported are available on 
www.curia.europa.eu.  
22
 See e.g. Ibcos Computers v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance [1994] FSR 275; Cantor Fitzgerald 
International v. Traditional [2000] RPC 95; Navitaire v Easyjet Airline [2005] ECDR 17.  
23
 Bently & Sherman, above n 12, 109 and 111. 
24
 See M. van Eechoud, ‘Along the Road to Uniformity - Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgments on 
Copyright Work’ (2012) 3 JIPITEC 1,  62-63; A. Firth and F. Gotzen, “Towards a single EU concept of 
originality?”, ALAI Congress, Dublin, June 30, 2011. 
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On the other hand, the concept of originality appears in three directives: the software, term 
and database directives. According to the travaux préparatoires
25
, originality was clearly 
only harmonised for the three types of works envisaged in these directives, namely computer 
programs, photographs and databases.
26
 The same term appears in all three directives: “the 
author’s own intellectual creation”. The vast majority of the literature thought that the SSJL’s 
standard is lower than that of the author’s own intellectual creation.27 On the other hand, 
some commentators argued that the concept of the author’s own intellectual creation is 
stricter in the term directive than in software and database directives owing to the use of 
“personality” in recital 17.28 Neither the travaux préparatoires nor the text of the Directive 
make clear whether the test for photographs is the same as that for software.
29
 However, it 
would be strange if the test was different for photographs as it is illogical to choose the same 
terms to describe a different standard. In conclusion, it was clear that Member States did not 
intend to harmonise the concepts of work and originality except for three types of work. 
However, it was unclear what the author's own intellectual creation actually meant and 
whether it had a different meaning for photographs as opposed to computer programs and 
databases. 
 
3. THE Court OF Justice’s INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF WORK AND 
ORIGINALITY  
                                                                
25
 European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM (95) 
382 final, Brussels, 19.07.1995,  27. 
26
 Van Eechoud, above n 24, 73 referring to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society of 1995. Even if it postdates the three relevant directives, the Commission restated this fact again in 
2004. If not the Member States, at least the Commission did not think that the criterion of originality was 
harmonised beyond photographs, computer programs and databases. See Commission Staff Working Paper on 
the review of the EC legal framework in the field of copyright and related rights, Brussels 19.07.2004, 
SEC(2004) 995, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ copyright/docs/review/sec-2004-995_en.pdf, 
no. 3.1,  14. See also L. Bently, “Harmonization by Stealth: Copyright and the ECJ”, Presentation at 20th Annual 
Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference, Fordham University School of Law, April 2012, available at 
http://fordhamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Bently_Harmonization.pdf.  
27
 J.A.L. Sterling, World Copyright Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 edn, 2008,  355-356; A. Strowel, Droit d’auteur 
et copyright, Bruylant, 1993, 469 (also noting that further evidence comes from the semi-conductor 
topographies directive which has a different criterion from that in the software directive namely the intellectual 
effort of its creator (art 2(2) of the directive)); Bently and Sherman, above n 12, 97; P. Torremans, Holyoak and 
Torremans’ Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2013, 200-201; M. van Eechoud, B. 
Hugenholtz, S. van Gompel, L. Guibault & N. Helberger, Harmonizing European copyright law: the challenges 
of better lawmaking, Kluwer, 2009, 42; E. Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright, Full Harmonization through 
Case Law, Elgar, 2013, 80;  I. Alexander, “The concept of reproduction and the ‘temporary and transient” 
exception’ [2009] 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 520, 522. Less decisive: W. Cornish & D. Llewelyn, 
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights, 6
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, 424, 
(the EU author's own intellectual creation is not the SSJL); A. Rahmatian, “Originality in UK copyright law: the 
old "skill and labour" doctrine under pressure” [2013] IIC 4. Synodinou (ed), Codification of European 
Copyright Law. Challenges and Perspectives, Kluwer, 2012 98 notes that some continental authors thought that 
the author's own intellectual creation simply meant originating from the author and thus was equivalent to the 
British standard, citing A. Lucas & H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, Litec, 3
rd
 edn, 
2006, 85, no 98 and M. Walter & S. von Lewinski, European Copyright Law, A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, 93-94.   
28
 Recital 17 reads in relevant part “A photographic work within the meaning of the Berne Convention is to be 
considered original if it is the author's own intellectual creation reflecting his personality, no other criteria such 
as merit or purpose being taken into account.” M. van Eechoud, B. Hugenholtz et al, above n 27, 41, referring to 
G. Karnell, “European Originality: A Copyright Chimera”, in J. Kabel & G. Mom (eds), Intellectual Property 
and Information Law: Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram, Kluwer, 1998, 201, 203; Rosati, above n 
27, 68, 69 and 71. 
29
 Karnell above n 28; Van Eechoud, above n 24, 62. 
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3.1. THE CONCEPT OF WORK 
The CJEU has now interpreted the notion of work in (at least) three decisions (Infopaq, BSA
30
 
and FAPL
31
). The Court said in the relevant passages of the three cases: 
Infopaq: “37. In those circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 is liable 
to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual 
creation.” 
BSA: “45. The Court has held that copyright within the meaning of Directive 2001/29 is liable to apply only in 
relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation (see, to 
that effect, with regard to Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, Infopaq International, paragraphs 33 to 37).  
46. Consequently, the graphic user interface can, as a work, be protected by copyright if it is its author’s own 
intellectual creation.” 
FAPL: “96. FAPL cannot claim copyright in the Premier League matches themselves, as they cannot be 
classified as works.  
97. To be so classified, the subject-matter concerned would have to be original in the sense that it is its author’s 
own intellectual creation (see, to this effect, Case C-5/08 Infopaq International [2009] ECR I-6569, paragraph 
37). 
98. However, sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within the 
meaning of the Copyright Directive. That applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules of 
the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.” 
Some have argued that already in Infopaq, the Court had totally harmonised the notion of 
work in the sense that the notion of work includes having categories or not as well as the 
fixation, the idea/expression and the originality requirements, adding that for the Court it 
meant that there are no categories and a work exists simply if the requirement of originality is 
fulfilled.
32
 This interpretation of Infopaq may be stretching the words of the Court a little 
far.
33
 However, in BSA, the Court went further and seems to imply that a work exists simply 
if it is its author's own intellectual creation.
34
 This implication was made clearer in FAPL 
where the Court arguably subsumed the notion of work with that of originality.
35
 These 
decisions have lead commentators to argue that the Court has done away with the UK 
categorisation system
36
, in other words that the list of works is not exhaustive.
37
 Some have 
                                                                
30
 Case C-393/09, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] 
ECR I-13971 (further referred to as BSA). 
31
 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services [2012] F.S.R. 1 (further referred to as FAPL).  
32
 C. Handig, “Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08): is the term "work" of the 
CDPA 1988 in line with the European Directives?” [2010] EIPR 53, 54-55. 
33
 See also S. Vousden, “Infopaq and the Europeanisation of Copyright Law” [2010] WIPO Journal 197, n 12. 
34
 Para 46. 
35
 Paras 96-98.   
36
 Some are more cautious than others: among them L. Bently “The Lionel, the Bezpečnostní softwarová 
asociace and the Wandering Court of Justice”, 11 January 2011, The IP Kat Blog, 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/lionel-bezpecnostni-softwarova-asociace.html (‘Although the language is 
not as clear as it might be, the CJEU seems to be saying that Directive 2001/29 requires that protection be 
afforded to any and every “intellectual creation”’); J. Davis, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford University Press, 
2012, 4
th
 edn, p. 25, mentions that Infopaq could make a difference in relation to the categories but does not take 
a position; W. Cornish, D. Llewelyn and T. Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and 
Allied Rights, 8
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013, no. 11-04 think it is debatable that the categories subsist after 
BSA and FAPL; E. Derclaye, “L’arrêt Softwarová: une révolution en droit d’auteur ou une « erreur de 
jugement »? [2011] 43 Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information (RDTI) 57, 59-60; J. Griffiths, 
“Infopaq, BSA and the 'Europeanisation' of United Kingdom Copyright Law” [2011] Media & Arts Law 
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argued further that since seemingly the only requirement for a work to subsist in EU law is 
that it is original, it would mean that there is no need to check if it is a work (apart from being 
an intellectual creation)
38
 nor whether it is recorded in a material form.
39
 The same argument 
could be made from the recent Nintendo ruling in which the Court holds that  ‘videogames 
[...]  constitute complex matter comprising not only a computer program but also graphic and 
sound elements, which, although encrypted in computer language, have a unique creative 
value which cannot be reduced to that encryption. In so far as the parts of a videogame, in 
this case, the graphic and sound elements, are part of its originality, they are protected, 
together with the entire work, by copyright in the context of the system established by 
Directive 2001/29.”40 This seems to suggest that videogames are not only computer programs 
but also artistic and musical works. It is a pity, and strange, that the Court did not extend its 
ruling to the game’s audiovisual element as it would have definitely overruled Nova if the 
correct interpretation of its case law is that categories no longer exist.  
Since the Court held that the term ‘work’ was an autonomous notion of EU law (as ‘work’ 
does not refer to national laws in any of the directives), it probably has the same meaning in 
all directives whether the directives define the term or not.
41
 Also, if the Court is coherent 
with itself
42
, it must apply its autonomous and uniform interpretation to all terms which do 
not refer to Member States laws. Nevertheless, if the amalgam between the notion of work 
and of originality is confirmed
43
, it is an error
44
 and thus unfortunate as it is bound to confuse 
national courts and to lead to wrong decisions (see e.g. below in section 3.2 in relation to 
‘rules of the game’). Hopefully, in a future reference, the Court will be able to rectify this. 
Indeed, if it is consistent, the Court would refer to article 2(1) of the Berne Convention and 
hold that first, courts must check whether something is a work before verifying whether it 
displays originality. It would also be consistent with its SAS ruling
45
 which confirms that 
copyright does not protect ideas and thus by implication it does not protect original ideas. 
 
In conclusion, since the term ‘work’ is an autonomous notion of EU law, even if the Court 
has not had to say it explicitly as it has never been asked the question, it probably means that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Review (“It is, after all, not a necessary step from (i) all ‘works’ must satisfy the ‘author’s own intellectual 
creation’ standard (Infopaq) to (ii) anything satisfying the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ standard is a 
‘work’”); J. Griffiths, “Dematerialization, pragmatism and the European copyright revolution” [2013] 33(4) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 767, 782 and 784; van Eechoud, above n 24, 66; Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies, 
Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, Sweet and Maxwell, 2
nd
 supplement to the 16
th
 
edition, 2013, 11 quoting SAS [2013] ChD RPC 17, paras 23 and 27 whereas others are more definite: Rosati, 
above n 27, 133 and  157; I. Silverman, “Copyright and fashion: friends at last?” [2013] EIPR 637, 642 
(commenting on BSA).  
37
 C. Handig “The "sweat of the brow" is not enough! - more than a blueprint of the European copyright term 
"work"” [2013] EIPR 334, 339. 
38
 S. Carre, « Le rôle de la Cour de Justice dans la construction du droit d’auteur de l’Union », in C. Geiger 
(ed.), La contribution de la jurisprudence à la construction de la propriété intellectuelle en Europe, Lexis 
Nexis/Université de Strasbourg/CEIPI, 2013, p. 1, 56; Griffiths 2013, above n 26, 782, 785; van Eechoud, above 
n 24, 66; Silverman, above n 36, 642 is more definitive.  
39
 Handig, above n 37, 339 (disputable that the fixation requirement can subsist as this aspect is likely to be 
covered by harmonisation); Griffiths 2013, above n 36, 782-783, 785.  
40
 Case C-355/12, Nintendo v PC Box et al [2014] nyr, para 43 (emphasis added). 
41
 C. Handig “The copyright term "work" - European harmonisation at an unknown level” [2009] IIC 665,  671, 
684; Handig, above n 32, 54-55; Handig, n 37 above, 334-335. 
42
 We shall see in section 6 that it is not always the case. 
43
 As Bently, above n 26, rightly said this is uncertain. Hence our use of the word ‘if’. 
44
 V.-L. Benabou, ‘L’originalité, Un Janus juridique, Regards sur la naissance d’une notion autonome de droit 
de l’Union’ in Mélanges en l'honneur d'André Lucas, Éditions du Jurisclasseur Lexis Nexis, forthcoming 2014  
(One cannot say something is not a work if it is not original. Something can be a work but can be banal). 
45
 Case C-406/10, SAS Institute v World Programming [2012] nyr (further referred to as SAS). 
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it will have to choose whether the categories are closed or open and probably would choose 
an open system as in the Berne convention. The same choice would have to be made in 
relation to fixation. Falling back on the Berne convention would not help as the convention 
specifically leaves it to Member States. If the Court, as it seems, keeps relying on its ‘high 
level of protection mantra’ (recital 9 of the infosoc directive), it is likely it would find that 
fixation is not required. 
 
3.2. ORIGINALITY 
The Court has now construed the requirement of originality in no less than seven decisions. 
They involved literary works (Infopaq) including computer programs (SAS), graphical user 
interfaces (“GUI”)46 (BSA), photographs (Painer47), football matches (FAPL), databases 
(Football Dataco) and works of applied art (Flos
48). The relevant passages of the Court’s 
reasoning, in chronological order, are as follows with our enphases:   
Infopaq: “45. [...] words [...], considered in isolation, are not as such an intellectual creation of the author who 
employs them. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words that the author may 
express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual creation. 
48. [..] the reproduction of an extract of a protected work which, like those at issue in the main proceedings, 
comprises 11 consecutive words thereof, is such as to constitute reproduction in part within the meaning of 
Article 2 of Directive 2001/29, if that extract contains an element of the work which, as such, expresses the 
author’s own intellectual creation; it is for the national court to make this determination.” 
BSA: “48. the national court must take account, inter alia, of the specific arrangement or configuration of all the 
components which form part of the graphic user interface in order to determine which meet the criterion of 
originality. In that regard, that criterion cannot be met by components of the graphic user interface which are 
differentiated only by their technical function”.  
FAPL: “98. However, sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within 
the meaning of the Copyright Directive. That applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules 
of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.”  
Painer: “88. [...] an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects the author’s personality.  
89. That is the case if the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of the work by 
making free and creative choices. ...  
92. By making those various choices, the author of a portrait photograph can stamp the work created with his 
‘personal touch’. 
94. Such photograph is an intellectual creation of the author reflecting his personality and expressing his free 
and creative choices in the production of that photograph. 
97. Moreover, nothing in Directive 2001/29 or in any other directive applicable in this field supports the view 
that the extent of such protection should depend on possible differences in the degree of creative freedom in the 
production of various categories of works. 
                                                                
46
 GUI can include literary, musical, dramatic or artistic works. 
47
 Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH [2011] E.C.D.R. 297 (further referred to as 
Painer). 
 
48
 Case C-168/09, Flos SpA v Semeraro Casa e Famiglia SpA [2011] E.C.D.R. 8 (further referred to as Flos). 
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98. Therefore, as regards a portrait photograph, the protection conferred by Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29 
cannot be inferior to that enjoyed by other works, including other photographic works.” 
Football Dataco: “38. that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the selection or arrangement of the 
data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an original manner by making free and creative 
choices and thus stamps his ‘personal touch’ [...] 
39. By contrast, that criterion is not satisfied when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical 
considerations, rules or constraints which leave no room for creative freedom [...] 
42. [...] the fact that the setting up of the database required, irrespective of the creation of the data which it 
contains, significant labour and skill of its author [...] cannot as such justify the protection of it by copyright [...], 
if that labour and that skill do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of that data.”  
SAS Institute: “66. [...] the keywords, syntax, commands and combinations of commands, options, defaults and 
iterations consist of words, figures or mathematical concepts which, considered in isolation, are not, as such, an 
intellectual creation of the author of the computer program.  
67. It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or mathematical concepts 
that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for 
the computer program, which is an intellectual creation”. 
Flos: “34. However, it is conceivable that copyright protection for works which may be unregistered designs 
could arise under other directives concerning copyright, in particular Directive 2001/29, if the conditions for that 
directive’s application are met, a matter which falls to be determined by the national court”.   
What can one conclude from all these formulas? At least three things are clear. First, very 
short works can be original (Infopaq). Second, as it is comprised in the concept of work, the 
concept of originality is also an autonomous uniform notion of EU law. Third, significant, 
labour or skill as such is not enough if there is no creativity (Football Dataco). As Sterling 
rightly said, some skills involve creativity, some not.
49
 This means that “sufficient skill” does 
not per se equate to creativity. Indeed, in our view, only judgement can sometimes equate 
with creative choices. Choice is not equivalent to creativity
50
 and the Court insists that the 
choices must be free and creative.   
On the other hand, at least two things are unclear. First, the CJEU case law indicates that if 
there is no room for creative freedom because of function, technical considerations, rules or 
constraints, originality cannot arise (BSA para 48
51
, Football Dataco para 39). It is therefore 
possible that a work that has some functionality is also creative. Although it is more 
ambiguous in Football Dataco
52
, both BSA and Football Dataco’s language allow for this 
possibility. Indeed, if this interpretation is not adopted, many deserving works would 
otherwise be left unprotected. As some have noted, constraints (such as themes, economic 
                                                                
49
 Sterling, above n 27, 354. 
50
 A.Waisman, ‘Revisiting originality’ [2009] EIPR 370, 375 citing A. Strowel, above n 27, 406: “… even if 
choice is an activity of the spirit through which it is possible to know someone's personality, choosing is not 
equivalent to creating”.    
51
 ‘that criterion cannot be met by components of the graphic user interface which are differentiated only by their 
technical function.’ (emphasis added). The terms ‘only by’ mean a contrario that if a GUI is not entirely dictated 
by function it can be protected by copyright. They also remind of the terminology used in article 7(1) of the 
design directive (Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the 
legal protection of designs OJ L 289/28). It is clear that functional designs can be protected. It is only when the 
aspect the designer wants protection for is entirely dictated by technical function that protection is denied. 
52
 The terms ‘which leave no room’ in para 39 can be interpreted both ways i.e. rules, constraints etc never leave 
room for creative freedom or they sometimes can. 
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demands, formats imposed by the employer or commissioner etc.) are often necessary to 
creation.
53
 On the other hand, by definition, the Court seems to be saying that the rules of a 
game never leave room for creative freedom (FAPL).
54
 Indeed, it is clear from parapraph 98 
in FAPL that it is not possible at all for football games (and thus any sporting events by 
analogy) to be protected by copyright but the Court seems to say that it is the case because 
they are not works, not because they are not creative. If the Court had more clearly made the 
distinction between the concept of work and the concept of originality, the confusion would 
have been avoided. It is thus ‘more’ because a football game is not a work (‘an intellectual 
creation’) rather than because it lacks originality that it is not protected by copyright. This is 
what paragraph 98 suggests but if it had been better drafted, it would have said that it is so 
simply because sport games are not works, full stop. If the Court had said this, it would have 
left no confusion and it would be clear that rules, constraints, function and technical 
considerations are not per se a bar to creativity. It is only when the work is entirely dictated 
by these rules etc that the work is not creative. The Court’s ambiguous wording in FAPL and 
Football Dataco leaves much to be desired and may lead national courts to the wrong 
conclusions.
55
 In this respect, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales seems to have 
clarified the ambiguity as it construed the CJEU case law as meaning that “[t]he more 
restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be the intellectual creation (or 
the expression of the intellectual creation) of the person who produced it”.56 
Second, it is not entirely clear that the criterion of originality (author's own intellectual 
creation) is the same for all works.
57
 This is because for literary works and GUI (first two 
cases of the series) and computer programs (last case of the series), the Court does not use the 
terms ‘personal touch’ which it uses for photographs and databases (both cases were decided 
between these two aforementioned cases). However, in Painer, the Court refers to Infopaq 
and FAPL to support its reasoning which probably means that the personal touch was 
included in the author's own intellectual creation from the start (i.e. in Infopaq) even if the 
Court did not utter it in its previous judgments. And in Football Dataco, the Court refers to 
all its previous rulings i.e. Infopaq, BSA, FAPL and Painer where it discusses originality.
58
 
Therefore, many commentators, including us, think the requirement is the same for all 
works.
59 
It would be illogical otherwise, as databases and photographs (especially in the cases 
referred) are no less functional than computer programs and GUI. It seems also that Painer 
put the nail in the coffin on different standards of originality since the Court states that the 
scope of copyright is not dependent on the degree of creativity the work displays. Provided it 
reflects the free and creative choices of the author, a ‘simple’ photograph (read ‘work’) is as 
protected as an elaborate one.
60
   
Thus, a rational construction of the Court’s case law means that not only the standard of 
originality is the same for all works (except perhaps for registered artistic works because of 
                                                                
53
 Benabou, above n 44; Handig, above n 37, 337.  
54
 Contra: Benabou, above n 44 who interprets FAPL as saying that protection is not granted when the rules of 
the game leave no room to creative freedom. 
55
 Similarly Benabou, above n 44. 
56
 SAS Institute v World programming [2013] EWCA civ 1482, para 31. 
57
 Many commentators who wrote after Infopaq and BSA but before the other decisions thought it did apply to 
all works in the same way. See e.g. V. Benabou, Note d’observations, C.J.C.E. (4e ch.), 16 juillet 2009 [2009] 
39 RDTI, 61 ff.; Handig, above n 41.  
58
 Van Eechoud, above n 24, 67. 
59
 Torremans, above n 27, 206; van Eechoud, above n 24, 67; Benabou, above n 44; Synodinou, above n 27, 
104. Contra: Rosati, above n 27, 187; Vousden, above n 33, p 202-203, but writing before BSA and the other 
decisions.  
60
  Painer, para 98. Synodinou, above n 27, 106. 
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Flos
61) but also the claim that the author’s own intellectual creation is stricter for photographs 
is now out. In conclusion, the criterion of originality for all works is “free and creative 
choices” - so long as the author can exercise those choices, there will be a personal touch and 
originality. It is indeed clear that choice, arrangement and creativity are all present from the 
start and in all judgments. Creativity results from choices or arrangements
62
 and the latter 
must be free and creative. This also means that the criterion adopted by the Court is 
subjective and not objective.
63
 Nevertheless, as the Court’s has sometimes zigzagged before 
coming to a settled position, only time will tell if the requirement of author's own intellectual 
creation is indeed the same for all works.  
 
4. IMPACT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S CASE  LAW ON UK COPYRIGHT LAW  
4.1. THE concept OF WORK  
 
If one accepts that the Court amalgamates the notions of work and originality then its rulings 
changed UK copyright law. The UK cannot rely on its categories any longer. If so, it is for 
the better, as it gets rid of the anomalies created by the act, as illustrated in Creation Records 
and Nova v Mazooma.
64
 There is no reason why static scenes and video games, if they are 
original, should not be protected by copyright. It also makes sense to have no categorisation 
system if one has a higher originality threshold as the latter makes it more difficult to obtain 
protection. In the past, the UK had the reverse system, closed categories but a more generous 
originality requirement. It would be even worse for authors compared to the prior UK law if a 
closed system was combined to a higher originality requirement.   
 
The impact of the CJEU case law is far reaching if categories no longer exist. Indeed, the 
purpose of categories is to differentiate between works as far as their regime is concerned not 
only in relation to protection requirements or duration such as between so-called ‘original 
works’ and ‘entrepreneurial works’ – as is also the case in civil law countries between 
author’s rights and neighbouring rights - but also between rights and exceptions of ‘original 
works’. For instance, authors of artistic works do not enjoy the same rights as other works (no 
adaptation or performance right).
65
 Likewise, not all exceptions apply to all works (e.g. fair 
dealing for reporting current events does not apply to photographs and the exception for 
reprographic copying by educational establishments of passages from published works does 
                                                                
61
 On this, see below section 4.2.1. 
62
 The words chosen by the Court in its rulings on originality not surprisingly echo those used in the Berne 
convention in relation to collections of works (“selection or arrangement”) when defining originality and stated 
again in articles 10(2) and 5 of the TRIPs agreement and WIPO Copyright Treaty respectively in relation to 
compilations of data or works. 
63
 E. Derclaye, “Wonderful or worrisome? The impact of the ECJ ruling in Infopaq on UK copyright law” 
[2010] EIPR 247; C. Caron, Comm. Com. Electr. 2009, comm.. 97; B. Michaux, Auteurs & Média 2009/5, 473, 
482; P. Sirinelli, D. 2011, 2166, all cited in A. Lucas, H.-J. Lucas & A. Lucas-Schloetter, Traité de la propriété 
littéraire et artistique, 4
th
 edn, Litec, para 123, n 407; Benabou, above n 44 (also stating that the formula at para 
42 of Football Dataco implies a more ‘industrial’ rather than ‘artistic’ notion of originality and wondering 
whether this more industrial notion applies to all works or only databases). Contra: A. Lucas, H.-J. Lucas & A. 
Lucas-Schloetter, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 4
th
 edn, Litec, citing E. Trepoz, RTDE 2010, 948 
who think that the CJEU has adopted an objective notion of originality.   
64
 See section 1. 
65
 See ss. 19 and 21 CPDA. 
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not apply to artistic works).
66
 In practical terms, it means that all exceptions will apply to all 
original works and since whether a work is literary or artistic no longer matters, the conflict 
between the electronic circuit diagrams case is resolved.
67
 If the CJEU case law abolishes the 
categories, it is welcome as there is no reason to treat different categories of original work 
differently. The infosoc directive
68
 does not differentiate between original works in relation 
to rights or exceptions and exceptions appearing in the CDPA which also appear in the 
infosoc directive have to comply with the latter. In fact, the UK government is proposing to 
abolish some of these differences.
69
  
4.2. ORIGINALITY AND THE TEST OF INFRINGEMENT 
 
There is at least one aspect that the CJEU case law does not change as the author's own 
intellectual creation still leaves a room for manoeuvre to national courts in this respect – it is 
the judge-made law principle that originality depends on the facts of the case and that it is a 
question of degree in each case.
70
 Even if Painer holds that the same protection should be 
afforded to all works and the degree of freedom should not be taken into account (a work 
which barely meets the originality requirement must be protected in the same way as a highly 
original work)
71
, a judge still has some room to manoeuvre. This is well illustrated in Temple 
Island Collections, an arguably borderline case which could have been decided it differently 
on the facts. Apart from this maxim, the CJEU case law on originality and the infringement 
test impacts UK copyright law in two ways: in some cases, it is clear that the rulings change 
UK law (section 4.2.1.) while in the other cases, it is not clear they do (section 4.2.2.). 
 
4.2.1. ASPECTS OF UK LAW THAT THE CJEU RULINGS CLEARLY CHANGE 
 
The CJEU decisions change UK law on originality in five ways and the test of infringement 
in one way.  
 
First, a work resulting from pure labour, skill or judgement is not original if this labour, skill 
or judgement does not result from free and creative choices. Judgement will probably meet 
that criterion in most cases unless the choices are banal or not free. What is clear though is 
that neither labour nor skill is required, but only free and creative choices. As we already said 
in 2010, subcreative works are now excluded.
72
 This may not involve a great number of 
                                                                
66
 Ss. 30(2) and 36 CDPA. 
67
 On this conflict, see n 7 above. 
68
 Only art. 5(3)(j) and (m) apply to specific works but it is obvious the exceptions can only apply to artistic 
works so that the proposition that the infosoc directive does not differentiate between works still holds. The 
relevant exceptions read: “3. Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for 
in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases: [...] (j) use for the purpose of advertising the public exhibition or sale 
of artistic works, to the extent necessary to promote the event, excluding any other commercial use; [...] (m) use 
of an artistic work in the form of a building or a drawing or plan of a building for the purposes of reconstructing 
the building”. 
69
 http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/hargreaves.htm and particularly the The Copyright and Rights in Performances 
(Research, Education, Libraries and Archives) Regulations 2014, available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111112755 which are about to be approved by Parliament. 
70
 Macmillan v Cooper, above n 15. 
71
 Painer, paras 97-98. 
72
 E. Derclaye, above n 63, 248-249. UK commentators are generally less certain in relation to the impact of 
Infopaq and its progeny on the notion of originality. See Cornish et al, above n 36,  no. 11-04 and 11-09 
(although they mention that Football Dataco clearly has an impact as football fixtures are not protected ‘despite 
significant skill and labour in creating data’); Davis, above n 37 p. 30 mentions Infopaq but does not take a 
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works but it is not negligible.
73
 It is therefore incorrect to say that “[o]riginality means that a 
sufficient amount of skill, labour and judgement has gone into the work in such a way that 
through the choices, selection and arrangement in the making of the work the author gives 
the work a modicum of individuality and so renders it his/her own intellectual creation”.74 
Skill and labour are not required. In fact, such statement is even contrary to the directives, 
which clearly state that no other criteria than the author's own intellectual creation may be 
used to determine originality. It is also incorrect to say that the CJEU case law has not 
changed the UK originality requirement.
75
 
 
The CJEU requires free and creative choices, not just choices. Indeed, there can be unoriginal 
choices or choices constrained by rules. It is clear therefore that Walter v Lane
76
 cannot 
withstand the CJEU originality test.
77
 The reporters exercised skill and labour but no 
judgment. They made no free or creative choices when recording faithfully the Earl of 
Rosebery’s speeches. In contrast, the Sawkins78 case would not be decided differently 
nowadays. Even if Dr Sawkins was trying to stick as closely as possible to Lalande’s lost or 
unfinished works, he had choices, exercised them and put his personality in the work.  
 
Second, a consequence of the first point is that no other area of law can protect the 
subcreative works now left unprotected by copyright as the UK lacks a full-blown unfair 
competition tort or statute.
79
 Passing off can only help if there is a misrepresentation (in sum 
some risk of confusion in addition to goodwill and damage). 
Third, as Infopaq makes clear that short works (e.g. titles, headlines) can be protected, it 
overrules UK law in this respect.
80
 However, arguably such protection will remain rare as not 
only will it be hard for short works to be expressions rather than ideas but also hard to be 
creative.
81
  
 
Fourth, the Football Dataco decision makes clear that anything done during the pre-
expressive stages does not count to determine originality, only the result does. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
position on its impact on originality; Torremans, above n 27, 206-208; Griffiths 2013, above n 36, 785 
(probably the standard is higher now and this will leave some works unprotected in the UK that were protected 
before). 
73
 Derclaye above n 63, 249. Contra: Rahmatian, above n 27, thinks that the practical difference of applying the 
new test in the UK will be probably very small. 
74
 Rahmatian, above n 27, 30. Emphasis added. 
75
 Taking the position that the new requirement is the same as the old UK requirement, Copinger, above n 36, 
24, no 3-128 and 26, no. 3-144. For C. Colston and J. Galloway, Modern Intellectual Property Law, 3
rd
 edn, 
Routledge, 2010, p. 368, Infopaq is in line with the prior UK case law in relation to infringement. They do not 
discuss the decision in relation to originality. But since the two are linked, the point they make is still relevant 
here). H. Laddie, P. Prescott & M. Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 4
th
 edn, Lexis Nexis, 
2011, sometimes confuse the old and new test of originality and infringement. 
76
 Walter v Lane [1900] AC 539. This case involved a number of reporters who took down in shorthand verbatim 
notes of a speaker’s speeches. 
77
 For Laddie et al, above n 75, 95 it is not as clear. For them, at best, Infopaq introduces uncertainty as to 
whether Walter v Lane is overruled. However, it is possible that the record of a shorthand writer could be 
protected as a sound recording. On this, see Derclaye above n 8, 7 ff.  
78
 Hyperion Records v Lionel Sawkins [2005] 3 All ER 636 (the case dealt with the reconstruction of 17th 
century music). 
79
 Derclaye, above n 63; Torremans, above n 27, 207; Bently, above n 26. 
80
 Derclaye, above n 63. UK case law held that copyright did not protect short works such as slogans and titles. 
See Francis Day & Hunter v Twentieth Century Fox [1940] AC 112, 123; Exxon Corp. v Exxon Insurance 
Consultants International [1981] 2 All ER 495, aff’d by [1981] 3 All ER 241. 
81
 Laddie et al, above n 75, 86; Torremans, above n 27, 210. 
14 
 
 
Fifth, the Court’s judgment in Flos82 confirms that Member States keep their national 
originality requirements for those designs which are registered, as article 17 of the design 
directive leaves this to Member States’ copyright laws but also implies that unregistered 
designs (i.e. works of applied art which are not also registered as designs) are now subject to 
the same originality requirement as all other copyright works i.e. the author's own intellectual 
creation. This is problematic for the UK, the only Member State which has a national 
unregistered design right. In the UK, the requirement for works of artistic crasftmanship (the 
category in which falls the vast majority of works of applied art) is higher than the author's 
own intellectual creation, namely the work must be artistic, which has been interpreted by 
UK courts as some level of artistic merit. The result of Flos is that works of artistic 
craftsmanship which are registered have a higher level of originality than those which remain 
unregistered.
83
 Thus, this means that two different originality standards can apply for one and 
the same work of applied art, depending if it is registered or not.
84
 This may discourage 
design registration in some cases. In addition, Flos also implies that the protection of 
unregistered designs must comply with articles 2 to 4 of the infosoc directive and exceptions 
must fall within the closed list of article 5 of the same directive.
85
  
  
Finally, as is known, the concept of originality finds it way back at the level of infringement. 
Indeed, the Court in Infopaq interpreted the reproduction right exactly this way as the test in 
the infosoc directive is ‘reproduction of the work or part of a work’. So long as the claimant’s 
own intellectual creation is found in the defendant’s work, infringement follows. Several 
consequences arise. First, is the UK ‘substantial part’ test unchanged by the new ‘original 
part’ test? The answer is both positive and negative. It is negative in the sense that it is still 
the quality of the part taken that counts not the quantity taken.
86
 Infopaq and its progeny have 
not changed this. But of course, the quality of the part is different now. It is not the SSJL 
found in the part but the author's own intellectual creation which is relevant.
87
 Also the other 
criteria of quality that courts checked in the past, such as whether the part was commercially 
relevant
88
, can no longer be used.
89
 Quality is now only related to the originality of the part 
taken. In this sense, the CJEU case law has changed the UK infringement test.
90
 In addition, it 
seems logical that the test of infringement as interpreted by the CJEU in respect of the right 
of reproduction applies to all other rights too.
91
 
   
4.2.2. ASPECTS OF UK LAW THAT IT IS UNCLEAR THE CJEU RULINGS 
CHANGE  
 
                                                                
82
 Above n 48. 
83
 Van Eechoud, above n 24, 69. Generally on the broader implications of the Flos ruling, see L. Bently, the 
return of industrial copyright?’ [2012] EIPR 654; T. Cook, “The Cumulative Protection of Designs in the 
European Union and the Role in such Protection of Copyright” [2013] 18(1) Journal of Intellectual Property 
Rights, 83-87. 
84
 Van Eechoud, above n 24, 69. 
85
 Bently, above n 26. 
86
 Laddie et al, above n 75, 151. 
87
 Derclaye, above n 63, 250. 
88
 BBC v Time Out [1984] FSR 64. 
89
 Derclaye, above n 63, 250. 
90
 Contra: Copinger, above n 36, 57, 59 and 60. 
91
 Griffiths 2013, above n 36, 784.  
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Three aspects are unclear in relation to the concepts of originality and one aspect is unclear in 
relation to the infringement test. 
 
The first question is whether Flos overrules the case law on artistic works, which clearly 
requires the artist intending that his or her work has visual appeal i.e. that the work is not 
purely functional (Lucasfilm).
92
 Two questions arise. Is this requirement part of the 
originality requirement or the definition of subject-matter? It matters if the CJEU has 
harmonised only the originality requirement and not the work requirement. If the UK 
‘purpose or intention requirement’ is part of the definition of the work and the CJEU has not 
harmonised the notion of work, then the UK can keep this requirement. But if the CJEU has 
harmonised the notion of work in the sense that it simply needs to be a literary or artistic 
work or the notion is amalgamated with the originality requirement, then the ‘purpose or 
intention requirement’ is overruled.93 This is because the software, term and database 
directives all say that no other criterion can be applied apart from the author's own 
intellectual creation.
94
 Another consequence is that at least UK unregistered design right 
(“UKUDR”) may become less interesting and eventually redundant as the protection 
requirement is lowered for artistic works which remain unregistered. This is because in most 
cases, it will be harder to prove that the UKUDR protection criterion namely SSJL and non-
commonplaceness
95
 is fulfilled than the author's own intellectual creation.
96
  
 
Second, a point of law established in Interlego may no longer be good law. In that case, the 
Privy Council held that since the essence of artistic works is visual significance, in the case of 
a derivative artistic work, the change must have visual significance for the new work to 
attract copyright.
97
 The case has lead some commentators to generalise this rule to all original 
works so that “to confer copyright, the skill and labour must produce a change which is 
relevant to the category of work in question”.98 Can one infer this from the CJEU case law 
too? The CJEU has not yet pronounced itself on derivative works but why would the 
originality requirement be different? Nothing in the directives indicates it should be and 
probably it is not because the directives state clearly that no other criteria than the author's 
own intellectual creation is applicable. All that is required is that the author has made free 
and creative choices so as to imprint the work with his personal stamp. This formula does not 
require that the author of an artistic derivative work must add something visually significant. 
The same would apply for any derivative work, whether artistic, literary, dramatic, audioviual 
or musical. However, since the CJEU has not yet had to hear a case about a derivative work, 
it will be interesting to see what it rules. And this will also impact at the level of 
infringement.
99
 
                                                                
92
 Lucasfilm v Ainsworth [2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch), aff’d by [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 and [2011] UKSC 39 (the 
issue was whether the helmet and armour of the stormtroopers in Star Wars films were protected by copyright). 
This requirement applies at least to sculptures and works of artistic craftsmanship. On this question, see Bently, 
above n 83. 
93
  Derclaye, above n 63, 250. Similarly, Rosati, above n 27, 207. 
94
 The term directive is the clearest in this regard as its recital 17 states that “no other criteria such as merit or 
purpose being taken into account. ». Recital 8 of the software directive states “Whereas, in respect of the criteria 
to be applied in determining whether or not a computer program is an original work, no tests as to the qualitative 
or aesthetic merits of the program should be applied”. Emphases added. 
95
 S. 213(4) CDPA.  
96
 See similarly Cook, above n 83, 86 (stating that it is ironic that the Cinderella of IPR now attracts far more 
protection via copyright and wondering whether the complex overlapping protections for design should not be 
repealed, the law only retaining copyright to protect designs).  
97
 Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Industries Inc. & Ors [1988] 3 W.L.R. 678, 258, 263, 266. 
98
 Bently & Sherman, above n 12, 99.  
99
 Griffiths 2013, above n 36, 788-789 hinting at this possibility in relation to infringement. 
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Third, if one accepts that the CJEU rulings have not abolished the categories, the CJEU case 
law poses a problem for non-original photographs in the UK. Indeed, there is only one 
category for photographs, and they must be original. What happens of the subcreative 
photographs? They cannot fall in any other category and therefore, must remain unprotected. 
This is so despite the possibility left in the term directive for Member States to protect them 
in some other way. On the other hand, if the CJEU case law has indeed abolished the 
categories, it still poses a problem for UK copyright law as it is not clear that Parliament had 
intended to protect unoriginal photos e.g. as entrepreneurial works.
100
 So, for the sake of 
clarity and legal certainty, the UK legislature should change the act to make clear that either 
non-original photographs can be protected as entrepreneurial works, as Mr Justice Arnold 
suggested
101
, or can benefit from a type of protection other than copyright or remain 
unprotected altogether. 
 
Finally, in relation to the test of infringement, the question is whether the judge-made rule 
that courts cannot dissect the work is still applicable.
102
 It may still be the case for altered 
copying rather than literal (exact) copying because in those cases the originality subsists in 
the way the entire work is arranged or created not in parts of it and we will need to wait for a 
CJEU case law that confirms this. But in case of literal copying, it seems that Infopaq allows 
dissection.  
 
Figure 1: Originality before and after the CJEU case law 
 
                                                                
100
 The authors of Copinger, above n 36, 26, no. 3-144 do not think courts will protect uncreative photographs 
post-Painer. See also Rosati, above n 27, 198-199. 
101
 R. Arnold, “Copyright in Photographs: A Case for Reform” [2005] EIPR 303 and ibid, “Content copyrights 
and signal copyrights: the case for a rational scheme of protection” (2011) 1(3) Queen Mary Journal of 
Intellectual Property 272, 277. 
102
 Ladbroke, above n 11, 277; Designers Guild v Russell Williams (Textiles) [2001] FSR 11, paras 6, 19, 31 and 
43; Baigent v Random House Group [2007] EWCA Civ 247, 131-132.  
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Caption: prior to Infopaq and its progeny, non creative ‘original’ works were protected via SSJL, now 
they are no longer protected. There are therefore fewer works protected now (as the orange line inside 
demarcates). The situation regarding entrepreneurial works has not changed. It was unclear how 
photographs were protected as a result of the non-implementation of the author's own intellectual 
creation in the act and the situation is still unclear after Infopaq although probably subcreative 
photographs now remain unprotected by copyright law altogether. 
 
5. HOW THE BRITISH JUDGES APPLY THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S CASE LAW 
ON THE CONCEPTS OF WORK, ORIGINALITY AND THE TEST OF 
INFRINGEMENT  
5.1. THE concept OF WORK 
So far the UK courts have not done away with the categories.
103
 In fact, while one judge 
simply mentioned the possibility that the CJEU case law implies a uniform open notion of 
work, another seems to have rejected the idea. In the SAS case on remand, Arnold J 
acknowledged the possibility that in the light of the CJEU case law, a work could be 
protected even if it does not fall within the categories set out at section 1(1) of the CDPA.
104
 
While recognising this possibility, he holds that it is clear that “the putative copyright work 
must be a literary or artistic work within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention” as per Infopaq.105 He carries on and holds that while the list in article 2(1) of the 
convention is not exhaustive, it still has limits, for instance “it is conventionally understood 
not to include sound recordings or broadcasts”.106 Finally, he disagrees that “because 
something is original (because it is an intellectual creation), it must consequently be a 
work”.107 In so holding, Arnold J expresses no view as to whether the CJEU has done away 
with the UK categorisation system. He only expresses the view that not everything and 
anything can be a work and seems to reject the view that the CJEU has amalgamated the 
notion of originality with the notion of work. In Moon, in a shorter passage, Birss J seems to 
reject the proposition that the categories are abolished.
108
  
In our view, the judges are right to doubt that the CJEU’s intention was to abolish the 
categories as the decisions are not entirely clear on this issue and the Court has never been 
asked this precise question.  
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 See e.g. Mitchell v BBC [2011] EWPCC 42, para 22; Temple Island Collections v New English Teas [2011] 
EWPCC 21 (where the judge classifies the work as a photograph or alternatively as a collage); Wilkinson v 
London Strategic Health Authority [2012] EWPCC 48 (referring to s. 1(1) and 3(1) of the act - original literary 
work); Taylor v Maguire [2013] EWHC 3804. 
104
 SAS Institute v World Programming [2013] EWHC 69, para 27. 
105
 Ibid, paras 32-37. 
106
 Ibid. He already had expressed this view in Dramatico [2012] EWHC 268, para 62.  
107
 Above n 104, para 34: “Counsel for SAS Institute argued that the SAS Language was an intellectual creation, 
and therefore it was a work. In my view that is a non sequitur. As counsel for WPL pointed out, there are many 
intellectual creations which are not works, such as scientific theories: see Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 406-
407. An article or book describing a scientific theory is a literary work, but for the reasons explained above that 
is beside the point when it comes to the question of whether the scientific theory per se is a work. I would add 
that treating the scientific theory as a distinct work protectable by copyright would undermine the exclusion of 
the theory from protection by the copyright in the article or book mandated by Article 9(2) of TRIPS and Article 
2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (...).” 
108
 Abraham Moon & Sons v Thornber et al [2012] EWPCC 37, paras 98-99. Birss J rejects the claimant’s 
argument based on Infopaq and Painer that there are no distinctions at infringement level between literary and 
artistic works.  
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5.2. ORIGINALITY  
 
Since the CJEU decision in Infopaq, originality and infringement have been discussed in no 
less than 15 decisions in the High Court and Court of Appeal (“CA”). We list them in 
chronological order and with the name of the judge delivering the judgment:  
 
2010: Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc and JK Rowling (Kitchin J)
109
; Football Dataco v 
Britten Pools (Floyd J)
110
; SAS Institute v World Programming (Arnold J)
111
; NLA v 
Meltwater (Proudman J)
112
; Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK (CA per Jacob)
113
;  
2011: Future Publishing v Edge Interactive Media (Proudman J)
114
; NLA v Meltwater (CA 
per The Chancellor of The High Court)
115
; Forensic Telecommunications Services v The 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (Arnold J)
116
; Temple Island Collections v New 
English Teas (Birss J)
117
; Hodgson v Isaac (Birss J)
118
;  
2012: Abraham Moon v Thornber (Birss J)
119
;  
2013: SAS Institute v World Programming on remand (Arnold J)
120
; Allen v Redshaw 
(Recorder Michaels)
121
; SAS Institute v World Programming (CA per Lewison J)
122
 and Suzy 
Taylor v Alison Maguire (District Judge Clarke).
123
 
 
This case law is very unsettled. In short, judges are either unaware of the CJEU case law’s 
effect, confused or inconsistent. Indeed, some judges are simply unaware of the change that 
Infopaq and the later CJEU decisions have had on the concept of originality and 
infringement. This is the case of Michaels
124
, Kitchin and Clarke JJ
125
. On the other hand, 
Floyd J added his own twist to the author's own intellectual creation criterion. For him, 
following Infopaq, the new originality criterion is “judgment, taste or discretion”.126 The 
judge found the list of fixtures (a database) protected by copyright as it was not the result of 
mere labour but involved a lot of skill.
127
 Granted, Floyd J did not have the insights from the 
                                                                
109
 Paul Gregory Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc and Joanne Kathleen Murray (professionally known as JK 
Rowling) [2010] EWHC 2560 (whether Harry Potter books infringed the copyright in the book Willy the 
Wizard). 
110
 [2010] EWHC 841 (football fixtures). 
111
 [2010] EWHC 1829 (computer program and manuals). 
112
 Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater Holding [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch) (newspaper headlines). 
113
 [2010] EWCA Civ 1380. 
114
 [2011] EWHC 1489 (logo using a certain font to write the word EDGE for a computer gaming magazine 
called ‘Edge’. The logo can be seen at http://www.edge-online.com/). 
115
 [2011] EWCA Civ 890. 
116
 [2011] EWHC 2892 (list of numerical data). 
117
 Above n. 103 (black and white photograph of a London bus (coloured red) crossing Westminster bridge with 
the Houses of Parliament in the background). 
118
 [2010] EWPCC 037 (Hodgson’s autobiography adapted by Isaac into a script for a film). 
119
 Above n 108. Artistic copyright in a woollen plaid upholstery fabric. 
120
 Above n 104. 
121
 [2013] EWPCC B1 (puppet show “Mr Spoon on Button Moon”).  
122
 Above n 56. 
123
 Above n 103 (whether papercuts (graphic works) were original and infringed by the defendant). 
124
 In Allen v Redshaw, the judge simply says that the requirement of originality for all artistic works is low. 
This is wrong both pre- and post-Infopaq. 
125
 Clarke J not only breaches Infopaq but also Painer when he utters at para 8:  “For an artistic work to be 
original it must have been produced as the result of independent skill and labour by the artist. The greater the 
level of originality in the work the higher the effective level of protection is, because it is the originality which is 
the subject of copyright protection.” Nowhere in the judgement does he rely on any of the CJEU judgments. 
126
 Paras 86-87, 91. 
127
 Para 41, 43. 
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following CJEU decisions (free and creative choices, personal touch) to rely on and was 
navigating rather in the dark. Mrs Justice Proudman has been inconsistent in the two cases 
she has had to decide namely Meltwater and Edge. First, in Meltwater, she held that Infopaq 
had changed the case law and she applied the new requirement of the author's own 
intellectual creation
128
 but then she did not even cite the case when deciding Edge; on the 
contrary, she relied only on Ladbroke to hold that the work was original.
129
 As to the 
Chancellor of the High Court, who delivered the judgment in the appeal of Meltwater, he 
confidently and clearly equates the two requirements. For him, Infopaq does not change the 
previous case law.
130
 In the appeal in Football Dataco, Jacob J was more prudent. For him, it 
was not clear that the two requirements are equivalent and he preferred to ask questions to the 
CJEU. The following is known; in the Football Dataco case, the CJEU confirmed that the 
two requirements are different. It is therefore strange that Lewison J does not acknowledge 
this in the SAS case on remand. He held that “This test may not be quite the same as the 
traditional test in English law” and “[i]f the Information Society Directive has changed the 
traditional domestic test, it seems to me that it has raised rather than lowered the hurdle to 
obtaining copyright protection.”131 (emphases added). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that if 
this is the case, the author's own intellectual creation is a higher threshold than the SSJL.
132
   
 
To make matters worse, over the years, both Arnold and Birss JJ have quoted the two 
requirements together in their judgments without stating their relationship, probably 
assimilating one with the other.
133
 Arguably, sometimes applying one or the other would have 
made no difference as the works were clearly creative (e.g. SAS, Moon). However, in his 
latest decision on the issue
134
, Arnold J does not use the SSJL test any longer but only the 
author's own intellectual creation, perhaps showing an acceptance that the SSJL is now 
clearly dead.
135
 It is a pity though that the latest case of the Court of Appeal (SAS) does not 
make entirely clear that SSJL and author's own intellectual creation are clearly different tests 
as is clear from the CJEU decision in Football Dataco. A shadow of doubt thus still lingers in 
the Court of Appeal which does not fare well for the future UK case law on originality, in 
view of the confusion in the lower courts. 
 
Courts have not applied the new originality requirement to works of artistic craftsmanship. In 
the last case to date, in appeal, Lucasfilm abandoned its alternative contention that the 
Starwars stormtrooper helmet qualified as a work of artistic craftsmanship in addition to a 
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 Paras 71, 78.  
129
 Para 10: “Dr Langdell submitted that the claimant can have no copyright in its EDGE logo because it is not 
original over the Franklin Gothic typeface. I do not accept this submission. The stretching of the font was 
combined with the distinctive slash and projection on the middle bar of the “E”. What is required for artistic 
originality is the expenditure of more than negligible or trivial effort or relevant skill in the creation of the work: 
see Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, 16th edn, at 3-130 and Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill 
(Football) Ltd [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 at 287. The claimant’s logo is original within this test”. 
130
 Para 20:  “I do not understand the decision of the European Court of Justice in Infopaq to have qualified the 
long standing test established by the authorities referred to in paragraph 19 above.” In para 19, he refers to 
University of London Press, above n 10 and Ladbroke, above n 11. 
131
 SAS, above n 56, paras 36-37. 
132
 See also ibid, para 65. 
133
 See e.g. Forensic Telecom, paras 84 and 91; SAS, above n 111, paras 57, 64, 129, 207, 233, 249, 255, 258-
261, 263, 322; Temple Island Collections, paras 27, 51 and 53 (the equivalence between the two requirements is 
also noted by Synodinou, above n 27, 102-103 and Rosati, above n 27, 195); then at para 68 he only uses the old 
test; Moon, para 56. However in Hogdson, at para 80, Birss J uses the term intellectual effort for the originality 
test, although he uses author's own intellectual creation for the test of infringement. 
134
 SAS, above n 120. 
135
 E. Derclaye, “Football Dataco: Skill and labour is dead!”, 2012, 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/03/01/football-dataco-skill-and-labour-is-dead   
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sculpture.
136
 There have been no new cases dealing with works of artistic craftsmanship 
since. Therefore, we do not yet know if the courts will apply the author's own intellectual 
creation to works of artistic craftsmanship which are not also registered as designs. 
 
5.3. THE TEST OF INFRINGEMENT  
The confusion is slightly less pronounced at the level of the infringement test. Taking the 
cases more or less chronologically again, in Allen v Bloomsbury Publishing Plc and JK 
Rowling, Kitchin J does not even mention Infopaq; he thinks it is only necessary to apply 
Baigent to decide infringement.
137
 Since only ideas were taken
138
, applying the Infopaq test 
would not have made a difference in that particular case. On the other hand, Arnold J in his 
first SAS decision clearly states that the test of substantial part is now dictated by Infopaq and 
UK courts have to examine whether the part taken incorporates the author's own intellectual 
creation.
139
 However, despite this clear statement, he then mixes the SSJL with the author's 
own intellectual creation when he decides infringement.
140
 This is unfortunate as it is unclear 
whether he thinks that the two are equivalent. In Forensic Telecom however, Arnold J does 
not use SSJL when he discusses infringement and clearly expresses that taking a substantial 
part means taking the author's own intellectual creation.
141
 He does the same in SAS on 
remand.
142
 Mrs Justice Proudman was also clear in NLA v Meltwater. She acknowledges that 
the test is the author's own intellectual creation and applies it, also noting that it would not in 
the case before her make a difference if one had applied the old substantial part/SSJL test.
143
 
However, the Court of Appeal in the same case does not apply the Infopaq test at the level of 
infringement but simply refers to the substantial part test.
144
 In Temple Island Collections, 
Birss J dealt with an artistic work (photograph) and relied not only on Infopaq but also 
Interlego.
145
 “In order to decide if a substantial part of an artistic work has been reproduced”, 
the court must look at the “elements of the work which have visual significance”.146 All he 
seems to be saying is that pre-expressive stages do not count, what counts is the result you 
see. If the implication of the application of Interlego is just that then it is in line with Football 
Dataco (which admittedly was decided after Temple Island Collections) and does not add to 
the CJEU case law. However, as we mentioned in section 4.2.2, applying Interlego’s visual 
significance test further could be contrary to the author's own intellectual creation test. In 
Hodgson, Birss J, like Arnold J, clearly states that “[a] substantial part must be one in which 
the elements thus reproduced are the expression of the intellectual creation of their author 
                                                                
136
 Lucasfilm, above n 92. 
137
 Para 80. 
138
 Ibid, para 86. 
139
 SAS, above n 111, para 243. 
140
 Ibid, para 260. See also paras 319 and 322. 
141
 Para 107. 
142
 Para 46. 
143
 Paras 69 and 85. 
144
 Para 28. 
145
 Temple Island Collections, paras 33-34. 
146
 Ibid, paras 34-35 (“Visual significance must also be relevant to infringement and to the question of whether a 
substantial part of an artistic work has been taken. What falls to be considered, in order to decide if a substantial 
part of an artistic work has been reproduced, are elements of the work which have visual significance. What is 
visually significant in an artistic work is not the skill and labour (or intellectual creative effort) which led up to 
the work, it is the product of that activity. The fact that the artist may have used commonplace techniques to 
produce his work is not the issue. What is important is that he or she has used them under the guidance of their 
own aesthetic sense to create the visual effect in question. Just because the Act provides for copyright in these 
original artistic works irrespective of their artistic quality (s4(1)(a)), does not mean that one ignores what they 
look like and focuses only on the work which went into creating them”).  
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(Infopaq).”147 While in the most recent decision of the Court of Appeal, Lewison J clearly 
affirms, like Birss and Arnold JJ, that the infringement test is now whether the defendant took 
a part which reflects the author's own intellectual creation
148
, the most recent case from the 
High Court does not even mention any CJEU case law and simply applies the old law.
149
 
Omitting the CJEU case law lead the High Court to imply that the degree of originality of a 
work could have an impact on the scope of protection, something Painer has now ruled 
out.
150
  
 
Some judges also tend to think that the test of infringement has remained a qualitative test 
after Infopaq. This is correct if by that one means that the part taken is the one which is 
original i.e. reflecting the author’s own intellectual creation. This also seems to be what the 
judges mean.
151
 
 
To wrap up on the infringement test, notwithstanding the hick-up in the Taylor case, the UK 
case law post-Infopaq is getting gradually more settled, with the Court of Appeal decision in 
SAS seemingly overturning its previous unclear decision in Meltwater on this point.
152
 
5.4. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, as we already had predicted153, the new criterion of author's own intellectual 
creation made a difference in many cases concerning borderline works namely Football 
Dataco
154
, Forensic Telecom
155
, Meltwater
156
, SAS
157
 or could have made a difference if it 
has been applied in Edge. So it is important to apply the correct test and not mix the old and 
the new tests, whether at the level of originality or infringement. It is dangerous that British 
courts use old requirements and equate them simply to the new ones. Sometimes it will not 
matter as the work is clearly creative but sometimes it will; so it is best to drop the old test 
altogether and only use the new one to avoid confusion and incorrect decisions.  
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 Hodgson, para. 74. 
148
 SAS, above n 120, paras 38-39.  
149
 Taylor v Maguire, above n 103, para 10. 
150
 Ibid, para 8:  “The greater the level of originality in the work the higher the effective level of protection is, 
because it is the originality which is the subject of copyright protection.” 
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and skill or originality of the work)”). Emphasis added. 
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 Strangely though, the Court of Appeal cites Meltwater with approval (para 38). 
153
 Derclaye, above n 63, 249. 
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 The CJEU reversed the finding of the High Court that the football fixture was protected by copyright. 
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 In this case, Arnold J rejects copyright for a database because it is not its author's own intellectual creation 
(para 90). 
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 Many headlines would not have passed the de minimis test for literary works. See above discussion and the 
rulings in Francis Day and Exxon, section 4.2.1. 
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 The High Court and Court of Appeal may well have found (parts of) SAS’s software protected under the 
SSJL. 
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What else should British, and for that matter Irish, judges do? As per the analysis in this 
section, they should think carefully which UK precedents are still valid and not assume that 
they are. In relation to the categorisation system, no one can reasonably claim now that it is 
clear that an original work not falling in a category is per se unprotectable. If a work does not 
fall in the categories, British and Irish judges should stay proceedings and ask a question to 
the CJEU to clarify the matter. Even if the Court’s answer may annihilate the categories, it is 
for the sake of legal certainty of both authors and users. Also if we retain the categories, we 
give our works less protection than our continental counterparts give theirs. British judges 
have not been shy in referring matters to the CJEU.
158
 It is thus likely that they will carry on 
doing so to push the Court to clarify its case law. However, national courts must be careful 
what they wish for because of the CJEU’s harmonisation bias.159 
 
6. Conclusion - WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?  
What one can conclude from the above analysis with certainty is that the Court’s decisions 
have had a rather drastic impact on the UK concepts of work, originality and the test of 
infringement. Whereas it is now clear that the author's own intellectual creation is higher than 
the SSJL
160
, the current state of the law is uncertain in relation to the categorisation system, 
the fixation requirement and to a lesser extent in relation to the infringement test. The same 
goes for other notions not examined in this article for reasons of space such as the adoption of 
the merger doctrine in BSA
161
 (a concept previously rejected in the UK
162
), the possible 
absorption of the right adaptation into the right of reproduction
163
 and the now possibly 
outdated liberal approach to the exceptions that the UK courts used to take.
164
 So while it is 
not clear yet that the CJEU has simplified UK copyright law as elegantly proposed by 
Christie over a decade ago
165
, leaving aside the questionable methods the Court uses to reach 
its rulings, undeniably “a European consensus on the concept of work and originality is [...] 
both inevitable and desirable”.166 
 
It is also worth noting that commentators in the UK have sometimes tended to think that the 
CJEU used the civil law notions of authors’ rights laws to interpet the provisions of 
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 UK courts asked the preliminary questions in three out of seven cases in the areas of copyright law reviewed 
in this article, more than any other Member State: Kitchin J in FAPL, Jacob J in Football Dataco and Arnold J 
in SAS. 
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160
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 Ibcos Computers v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance [1994] FSR 275, 292, 301. 
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 A. Ohly, “Economic Rights” in Estelle Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 
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FSR 610, 620 and Fraser-Woodward Ltd v BBC [2005] EWHC 472, ‘current’ in Hyde Park Residence v Yelland 
[2000] 3 WLR 215, and ‘event’ in Pro Sieben, ibid, 625. 
165
  A. Christie, “A Proposal for Simplifying United Kingdom Copyright Law” [2011] Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 26, 40 who proposes a consolidation of the categories and a corresponding harmonisation of exclusive 
rights. 
166
 Bently, n 36 above. 
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directives.
167
 This may lead to believe that the case law has no impact in those countries. 
However, a quick look at the literature reviewing the impact of the CJEU case law in some of 
these Member States shows that the CJEU decisions also impact civil law countries, even in 
Member States the least impacted so far such as France, and sometimes in rather drastic ways 
too. There is no space in this article to discuss some examples, but the reader can be referred 
to the literature.
168
 This analysis shows that the CJEU case law is affecting both civil law and 
common law systems and developing a truly ‘communautaire copyright’, in other words, new 
notions based neither on civil law nor on common law concepts. 
As will be explained in detail in a forthcoming article
169
, while consensus on many copyright 
notions is desirable not the least for legal certainty, its date of birth is not very predictable. 
This is because the Court has used a high number of interpretation methods rather 
inconsistently. This makes it hard to speculate on the future direction of its case law. In view 
of the inevitably piecemeal harmonisation work the Court can achieve and of its often unclear 
case law, it is evident that more legislative harmonisation is needed
170
, or even simply 
legislative intervention (i.e. clearly stating no harmonisation is required in some areas). 
Indeed, if anything, this state of affairs should incentivise the Commission to take the 
initiative to harmonise more or the EU institutions to clearly state in legislation that some 
areas are not harmonised to avoid the Court’s application of the principle of autonomous and 
uniform notion of EU law. Judicial harmonisation is inevitable but reversible. In the 
meantime, the dialogue between the national courts and the CJEU can carry on.
171
 And it is 
not and does not have to be just one way. As the decision in SAS on remand has shown, the 
national court can give hints to the CJEU about its concern over certain unclear aspects of its 
rulings.
172
 The dialogue can also occur between academics and the Court, and not just via 
conferences and writings
173
 but face-to-face meetings.
174
 How the CJEU case law in the field 
of copyright will develop can also be studied more effectively by political scientists, who in 
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fact have already started analysing the Court’s behaviour for several years now175 or even 
interdisciplinarily.  
That said the CJEU’s harmonising judgments do not always achieve their aim. It has been 
slow in the UK but finally, five years on, the UK courts seem to have integrated the new 
notion of originality. But it is not always the case. In Sweden, in cases arising post-Infopaq, 
many courts have carried on applying the Swedish originality requirement with no reference 
to the CJEU decisions.
176
 It would be interesting to discover what the situation is in other 
Member States. No doubt such research, and further dialogue between all interested parties, 
will eventually lead to that Graal of legal certainty copyright academics and practitioners are 
aspiring for and even to European consensus on such important notions of copyright law. 
                                                                
175
 E.g. K. Alter, “Who Are the Masters of the Treaty?” [1998] 52(1) International Organization, p. 121-147 and 
ibid, “The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?” [2000] 54 Int Org 
489.  
176
 Bengtsson, above n 168, and cases cited therein. 
